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Recent Developments
FEDERAL SECURITIES-SEARCHING FOR A DEFINITION OF
MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 14(e) OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (3d Cir. 1984)*
In 1968, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 19341
by enacting the Williams Act,2 a statute providing for the regulation of
cash tender offers. 3 By including provisions that require full disclosure,
the Act was designed to enable target companies' shareholders to make
an educated decision as to whether to tender their shares. 4 The Wil-
liams Act also contains a broad antifraud provision, section 14(e), 5
which prohibits both omissions or misstatements of material fact, and
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with any
* Editor's Note: As a matter of policy, the Villanova Law Review generally
treats decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
the Third Circuit Review, published annually in issues 3-4. This note is being
published separately in view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision. See Schreiber v.
Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
1. 15 U.S.C. .§§ 78a-78kk (1982).
2. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2811. Former Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of
New Jersey was the cosponsor and namesake of the Act. 113 CONG. REC. 854
(1968) (statement of Sen. Williams). Williams first introduced the bill in order
to protect incumbent management from losing control of the corporation to un-
desirable corporate raiders. 111 CONG. REC. 28254 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Williams). By the time the bill was enacted, however, Senator Williams recog-
nized the legitimate social and economic benefits that cash tender offers could
produce, such as the reduction of inefficient management. See 113 CONG. REC.
854 (1968) (statement of Sen. Williams). Consequently, the terms of the Wil-
liams Act favor neither management nor the offeror. Id. Instead, the Act relies
on the target company's shareholders to decide whether the corporation should
be taken over. Id. at 855. For a discussion of cash tender offer legislation, see
generally Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulations of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1984).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811. In order to comply with the requirements of the Wil-
liams Act, a tender offeror must file a statement with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission disclosing such information as its background and identity,
the source and amount of funds to be used to pay for the tendered shares, any
plans to make major changes in the target company's corporate structure, and
the existence of arrangements with any person with respect to any securities of
the issuer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(C), (E) (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
(287)
1
Lehrer: Federal Securities - Searching for a Definition of Manipulation u
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
288 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 287
tender offer. 6 Presently there is a split of opinion among the circuits as
to the definition of manipulation under section 14(e). 7 Also unsettled is
what a plaintiff needs to prove in order to recover on a claim for a ma-
terial omission under section 14(e), particularly where the omission is of
facts which also give rise to a state law claim.8 The Third Circuit re-
cently addressed both of these issues in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc.9
In Schreiber, Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington) sought to take
over El Paso Gas Company (El Paso) on December 21, 1982, by making
a cash tender offer bid for 25.1 million El Paso shares at $24 per share
(December tender offer). 10 El Paso's management initially considered
the takeover hostile and countered with several defensive measures."I
Nevertheless, the offer was fully subscribed, but not oversubscribed, by
the December 30, 1982 deadline.' 2
Subsequently, Burlington declined the shares tendered in Decem-
ber; instead, it entered into negotiations with El Paso's management.' 3
As a result of these negotiations, Burlington and El Paso's management
6. Id. The full text of § 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsec-
tion, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts or practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative.
Id.
7. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 165 (3rd Cir.), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984). For a full discussion of the split among the courts
over the definition of manipulation under § 14(e), see infra notes 25-38 & 50 and
accompanying text.
8. For a full discussion of the elements of a material omission of fact claim
under § 14(e), see infra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
9. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984). The case was
heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Sloviter, and Judge Teitelbaum of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation. Id. at 164. The opinion was written by Judge Adams. Id.
10. Id. at 164. Prior to December of 1982, Burlington had purchased over
500,000 shares of El Paso on the open market. Id. The December cash tender
offer for 25.1 million shares of El Paso common stock would have given Burling-
ton 51% of El Paso's common stock. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 197, 199 (D. Del. 1983).
11. 731 F.2d at 164. El Paso's management reacted to the takeover attempt
by implementing the following defensive measures: it brought suit against Bur-
lington, threatened to dispose of its assets, announced the issuance of a new
class of preferred stock, and amended its bylaws. 568 F. Supp. at 199.
12. 731 F.2d at 164.
13. Id.
2
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entered into a new and friendly takeover agreement.14 Under the terms
of this agreement, Burlington covenanted to make a cash tender offer
for only 21 million shares of El Paso stock at $24 per share (January
tender offer). 15 In addition, Burlington agreed to recognize "golden
parachute" contracts between El Paso and four El Paso officers.
16
The January tender offer was greatly oversubscribed; thus the
shareholders who had tendered their shares in December, and then
retendered in January, were subject to substantial proration.' 7 Barbara
Schreiber (Schreiber), a shareholder of El Paso, sustained a substantial
loss from this proration.' 8 As a result she instituted an action in federal
district court in Delaware, on behalf of herself and others similarly situ-
ated, seeking redress against Burlington, El Paso, and the board of di-
rectors of El Paso.' 9
Schreiber alleged that the defendants' conduct violated section
14(e) in two respects. First, Schreiber claimed that defendants' cancella-
tion of the fully subscribed December tender offer and the institution of
the January tender offer constituted a manipulative act prohibited by
section 14(e). 20 Second, Schreiber argued that defendants' failure to
disclose in the January tender offer the fact that certain El Paso directors
were granted golden parachutes, and the fact that El Paso's directors
interfered with and finally approved the takeover because of these
favorable arrangements, constituted material omissions in violation of
14. Id.
15. Id. at 165.
16. Id. A "golden parachute" is a contract that provides financial security
for top officials of a target company if they are discharged or downgraded after a
takeover. Id. at 165 n.2. In Schreiber, El Paso filed a Schedule 14D-9 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 12, 1983, describing the em-
ployment agreements in question. Id. The agreements provided four officers
with " 'continued employment with the Company in their current positions and
at not less than their current salary levels' for periods of either three or five
years." Id. For a further discussion of golden parachute contracts, see Prentice,
Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law Be 'Mobil'ized to Overcome the
Business Judgement Rule?, 8 J. CORP. LAw 337, 341 (1983).
17. Id. at 165. In the January tender offer, Burlington requested only 21
million shares; however, over 40 million shares were tendered. 568 F. Supp. at
200. The Williams Act provides that if more shares are tendered than the bid
originally requested, the offeror must purchase on a pro rata basis from all
shares tendered within 10 days of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). The
Securities and Exchange Commission amended rule 14d-8 to require pro rata
purchase of all shares tendered during the period that the offer remains open.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983). Therefore, in Schreiber, each shareholder who
tendered in response to the January tender offer only had approximately one-
half of their shares purchased. As a result, all those who had tendered in re-
sponse to the December offer, which was not oversubscribed, would have had all
of their shares purchased; instead they were forced to tender their shares anew
and thus were subject to extensive proration. 568 F. Supp. at 200.





Lehrer: Federal Securities - Searching for a Definition of Manipulation u
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
section 14(e). 2 1 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 22 The district court
granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. 23
On appeal, the Third Circuit first addressed Schreiber's claim that
the substitution of the January tender offer for the December tender of-
fer constituted a manipulative act in violation of section 14(e). 24 Noting
the existence of a split among the circuits with respect to the definition
of manipulation under section 14(e), the Third Circuit began its analysis
by examining both the Sixth Circuit's and the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of the term. 2 5
The Sixth Circuit, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 defined ma-
nipulative acts as acts which affect "the market for, or price of, securities
by artificial means, i.e., means unrelated to the natural forces of supply
and demand."'2 7 This definition was set forth in the context of a take-
over battle in which Marathon Oil had granted two options to a friendly
bidder, United States Steel, in an attempt to defeat a hostile takeover by
Mobil.2 8 Mobil subsequently brought an action to enjoin the exercise of
21. Id.
22. Id. at 204-05. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a
claim on the grounds that the willful breach of a tender offer contract is not a
manipulative act in violation of § 14(e). Id. at 200. In addition, defendants con-
tended that "the failure to disclose that El Paso granted 'golden parachutes' to
its directors and that these directors breached their fiduciary duties by causing
the termination of the December tender offer are also not Section 14(e) viola-
tions because the failure to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty in tender offer
materials is not a Williams Act violation." Id.
23. Id. at 204-05 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
24. 731 F.2d at 165.
25. Id. (citing Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5
(2d Cir. 1983) (manipulation under section 14(e) must involve some sort of mis-
representation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983);
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (manipulative act
under § 14(e) does not require a showing of deception)). For a further discus-
sion of Mobil, see infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. For a further discus-
sion of Data Probe and Buffalo Forge, see infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
26. 669 F.2d 366.
27. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit set forth this defini-
tion after reviewing Supreme Court and other court of appeals decisions inter-
preting various provisions of the Securities Acts which use the term
manipulation. Id. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (Supreme
Court interpreted manipulation under rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 as conduct intended to deceive investors by artificially affecting market
activity); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (same); Cargill, Inc.
v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eighth Circuit interpreted manipula-
tion as used in the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1982), as con-
duct intended to cause the stock price not to reflect natural supply and demand),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
28. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 367-68. United States Steel (U.S. Steel) offered to
buy 30 million shares of Marathon stock for $125 per share. Id. at 367. The
offer, however, was conditioned upon Marathon granting U.S. Steel two options.
Id. The first option was an irrevocable stock option to purchase ten million
[Vol. 30: p. 287290
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the options on the grounds that they "served as . . . 'lock up' arrange-
ment[s] to defeat any competitive offers of Mobil or third parties,
thereby constituting a 'manipulative' practice 'in connection with a
tender offer,' in violation of section 14(e) .... 29 Because the options
artificially affected normal market activity and were a significant deter-
rent to competitive bidding for Marathon shares, the Sixth Circuit found
that they constituted manipulative acts in violation of section 14(e). 30
The Sixth Circuit reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that
there was full disclosure, and thus no deception. 3 '
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's broad definition of manipulation,
the Second Circuit, in both Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.3 2 and Data
shares of authorized but unissued Marathon stock. Id. The second option was
to purchase one of Marathon's most valuable assets, Yates Field Oil Reserve. Id.
The Yates Field option was exercisable only if a hostile offeror, such as Mobil,
gained control of Marathon. Id. Marathon's directors voted to recommend U.S.
Steel's offer and to grant it the two options. Id.
29. Id. at 368. A "lock-up" is an arrangement "made in connection with
the proposed acquisition ...that gives the ...acquiror an advantage in ac-
quiring the target over ...bidders or potential bidders. . . . [A] lock-up ar-
rangement merely increases a bidder's likelihood of success and creates barriers
to a competing bidder." Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REV. SEC.
REG. 821, 821 (1981). Target companies in the past have employed a variety of
lock-up techniques including "the sale or granting of an option to sell major
assets or stock, agreements not to tender shares, irrevocable proxies, and agree-
ments not to vote shares." Note, The Future of Lock-ups After Mobil v. Marathon
Oil, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 261, 265 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
30. 669 F.2d at 375. The court found that Yates Field was a significant
asset and a very important attraction to potential bidders for control of Mara-
thon. Id. The court found that by granting U.S. Steel the option to purchase
Yates Field, Marathon had effectively deterred other potential bidders from pro-
posing a tender offer. Id. Since other bidders would be deterred from bidding
for Marathon, the court found that U.S. Steel's bid of $125 per share amounted
to an artificial ceiling for Marathon shares. Id. As a result, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the option was manipulative in violation of § 14(e). Id. at 377. In
addition, the Sixth Circuit found the stock option that U.S. Steel received was
for a large enough number of shares and at a low enough price that it prevented
all other bidders from competing on par with U.S. Steel in bidding for a control-
ling block of Marathon's shares. Id. at 375-76. In conclusion, the court stated
that "[t]he Yates Field option and the stock option, both individually and in
combination, have the effect of circumventing the natural forces of market de-
mand in this tender offer contest," and thus constitute manipulative acts in vio-
lation of § 14(e). Id. at 376.
31. Id. at 376-77. The court rejected Marathon's argument that § 14(e) re-
quired full disclosure and nothing more. Id. at 376. Although conceding that
nondisclosure was usually an essential element of a manipulation claim, the
court explained that this case was an illustration of the fact that disclosure alone
will not always preclude a finding of manipulation. Id. The Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that even if the shareholders were fully informed of the options and their
effect, the options still would have caused an artificial ceiling on the price of
Marathon's shares; thus disclosure did not prevent a finding of manipulation
under § 14(e). Id. at 377.
32. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
1985]
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Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.,33 held that misrepresentation is a
necessary element of a manipulation claim under section 14(e). 34
In Buffalo Forge, plaintiff, the successful bidder in a takeover battle,
brought suit against defendants, competing bidder and target company,
seeking rescission of a treasury stock sale and purchase option executed
in favor of the competing bidder prior to plaintiffs takeover of the tar-
get company. 3 5 Plaintiff asserted that the option and sale constituted
manipulative acts in violation of section 14(e). 36 In Data Probe, a bidder
in a takeover battle sought to enjoin the target company from granting
an option to a competing bidder, claiming that it was a manipulative.act
in violation of section 14(e).3 7 Because it failed to find an element of
misrepresentation in either Buffalo Forge or Data Probe, the Second Cir-
cuit denied recovery in both cases.
38
33. 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
34. Id. at 5-6; Buffalo Forge, 717 F.2d at 759.
35. 717 F.2d at 758-59. In Buffalo Forge, plaintiff, Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp.
(Ampco), made an initial bid of $25 per share to Buffalo Forge's shareholders.
Id. at 758. In response to that bid, Buffalo Forge's board of directors began a
search for more favorable offers. Id. After negotiations, the directors approved
a merger plan with defendant Ogden Corp. which called for an even exchange of
Ogden shares, then trading at $32.75 per share, for Buffalo Forge shares. Id.
The merger plan also included an agreement to sell Ogden 425,000 shares of
Buffalo Forge treasury stock and to grant Ogden an option to purchase addi-
tional treasury stock within one year. Id. After the agreement was executed, a
bidding war ensued between Ampco and Ogden which Ampco eventually won
with a bid of $37.50 per share. Id. at 759. After completing the takeover,
Ampco refused to honor the Ogden treasury stock purchase agreement and
sued for rescission of the transaction. Id.
36. Id. at 759.
37. 722 F.2d at 3-6. In Data Probe, CRC Information Systems, Inc. (CRC)
and Datatab, Inc. initially announced a merger agreement contingent upon ap-
proval by two-thirds of Datatab's shareholders. Id. at 2. By the agreement's
terms, Datatab was to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of CRC. Id. Before
Datatab's shareholders voted on the agreement, Data Probe, Inc. announced a
cash tender offer for any and all of Datatab's stock. Id. at 2-3.
Subsequently, Datatab and CRC revised their merger agreement and in-
cluded in it a grant to CRC of a one-year, irrevocable option to purchase
1,407,647 unissued Datatab shares. Id. at 3. The option, in effect, guaranteed
that CRC could acquire Datatab because Datatab only had 703,836 shares of
common stock outstanding; thus, no matter how many of the outstanding shares
were tendered to Data Probe, CRC would have a majority by exercising its op-
tion. Id. Data Probe then brought an action to enjoin the option. Id.
38. Buffalo Forge, 717 F.2d at 759-60; Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 5-6. The Sec-
ond Circuit concluded in both cases that misrepresentation is an essential ele-
ment of a manipulative act; however, it used somewhat different reasoning to
reach this conclusion in each case.
In Buffalo Forge, the Second Circuit ascertained from past Supreme Court
cases that the purpose of the Williams Act was to furnish shareholders who are
confronted with cash tender offers essential information regarding the qualifica-
tions and intentions of the tender offeror. 717 F.2d at 760 (citing Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S.
49, 58 (1975)). In light of the Act's purpose of full disclosure, the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that a misrepresentation, i.e., the omission or misstatement of a
6
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Having considered the applicable case law defining manipulation
under section 14(e), the Third Circuit examined three factors in order to
determine which circuit's approach was the more accurate view.
First, the Schreiber court considered the legislative intent underlying
the Williams Act.39 The main purpose behind the Act, the Third Circuit
determined, was to provide full disclosure to shareholders to ensure that
they could intelligently respond to a tender offer. 40 In light of this pur-
pose, the Third Circuit found that it was appropriate to require some
form of misrepresentation or deception as an element of a claim for ma-
nipulation under section 14(e). 4 1
Second, the Third Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's definition
of the term manipulation in actions under rule lOb-5 42 as set forth in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green43 and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.4 4 In
those two cases, the Supreme Court defined manipulation as conduct
material fact, is an essential element of § 14(e) manipulation. Id. at 760. Find-
ing no misrepresentation or misleading conduct in the facts alleged, the Buffalo
Forge court held that there was no manipulation under § 14(e). Id.
In Data Probe, the Second Circuit initially found that the Supreme Court
held that the proscription of manipulative devices under rule lOb-5 did not ex-
tend to complaints which solely alleged that management had treated sharehold-
ers unfairly or breached its fiduciary duty. 722 F.2d at 4 (citing Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)). Rather, the Second Circuit pointed out
that in order to prove a claim for manipulation under rule lOb-5, the Supreme
Court required the plaintiff to show that management's actions artificially af-
fected normal market activity and were intended to mislead shareholders. Id.
(citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477).
Noting that it had previously held that the definition of manipulation under
rule lOb-5 was applicable to manipulation under § 14(e), the Second Circuit
held that in light of the Santa Fe analysis, manipulation under § 14(e) was not
designed to cover shareholders' claims of mistreatment absent a showing of mis-
representation. 722 F.2d at 4 (citing Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d
51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982)). Concluding that the essence of plaintiffs claim was
merely for breach of fiduciary duty and that there was no misrepresentation, the
Second Circuit dismissed the complaint. Id. at 4, 6.
39. 731 F.2d at 165-66.
40. Id. at 166 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813 (Williams Act designed to
provide shareholders with all relevant facts in order to intelligently decide
whether to tender their shares); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967)
(same)).
41. 731 F.2d at 166.
42. Because the Third Circuit found rule lOb-5 analogous to § 14(e), the
court looked to Supreme Court precedent defining manipulation under rule
lOb-5 as persuasive authority for its own holding under § 14(e). Id. For a fur-
ther comparison of the two rules, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
43. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, defendant Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
(Santa Fe), executed a short form merger with Kirby Lumber Corp. (Kirby) pur-
suant to Delaware law, whereby an owner of more than 90% of a corporation's
stock can compel minority shareholders to sell their shares back to the corpora-
tion at a price set by the board of directors. Id. at 465. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 253(a) (1975). Kirby's minority shareholders objected to the terms of the
merger and brought suit in federal court, alleging that Santa Fe had offered a
19851
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intended to mislead or deceive investors by artificially affecting market
activity. 4 5 This limited definition of manipulation further convinced the
Third Circuit that an element of deception was required in order to find
manipulation under section 14(e). 4 6
Third, the Schreiber court examined the Supreme Court's broad lan-
guage in Santa Fe instructing courts to be reluctant to federalize state
corporate law.4 7 Reasoning from Santa Fe, the Third Circuit found that
without a requirement of deception, potentially every action undertaken
during a tender offer battle would amount to manipulation under sec-
tion 14(e). 48 This result, the Third Circuit found, would violate the
Santa Fe instructions because it would require federal supervision of the
fairness of virtually every cash tender offer, and thereby mandate the
federalization of state corporate law.4 9
For the above reasons, the Third Circuit refused to endorse an ex-
pansive interpretation of manipulation, and held, in accordance with the
fraudulently undervalued price for Kirby's stock in an attempt to freeze out the
minority shareholders in violation of rule lOb-5. 430 U.S. at 466-67.
At the outset, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's finding that
a breach of fiduciary duty, absent deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclo-
sure, violated rule lOb-5. Id. at 476. Instead, the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was either "manipulative" or
"deceptive" in order to prove a cause of action under rule lOb-5. Id. at 473-77.
Examining the claim before it, the Supreme Court found that there was no
deception because there was full disclosure to the minority shareholders of all
necessary information on which to base their investment decision. Id. at 474. In
determining that Santa Fe's conduct was not manipulative, the Santa Fe Court
found that, in the securities area, manipulation was virtually a "term of art" re-
ferring generally to practices such as wash sales or rigged prices. Id. at 476.
This "term of art," the Court held, was not intended to regulate the alleged
violation, which constituted no more than corporate mismanagement and
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 477. Because there was no deception or manipu-
lation, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no rule lOb-5 violation. Id.
at 477, 480.
44. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Ernst & Ernst, plaintiff, Hochfelder, alleged that
the accounting firm, Ernst & Ernst, had negligently failed to discover an escrow
account fraud scheme perpetrated by the president of a brokerage firm that re-
tained Ernst & Ernst. Id. at 190. Hochfelder alleged that this negligent nonfea-
sance violated rule lOb-5. Id. The Supreme Court held that mere negligent
conduct under rule 1Ob-5 was not enough to hold a defendant liable; rather, a
defendant must have the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193.
Because no intentional conduct was alleged in the complaint, the Supreme
Court concluded that there was no rule 1Ob-5 violation. Id. at 193, 214-15.
45. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199. For a fur-
ther discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of manipulation, see infra
notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
46. 731 F.2d at 166.
47. Id. The language in Santa Fe to which the Schreiber court referred states
that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to fed-
eralize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities .... " 430 U.S. at 479.
48. 731 F.2d at 166.
49. Id.
294 [Vol. 30: p. 287
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Second Circuit's view, that deception was an essential element of a ma-
nipulation claim under section 14(e). 50 The court concluded that be-
cause Burlington fully disclosed its withdrawal of the December tender
offer, there was no deception, and thus, no manipulation under section
14(e).51
The Schreiber court next rejected Schreiber's second claim that Bur-
lington's failure to disclose the golden parachutes constituted a material
omission in violation of section 14(e). 52 Although the Third Circuit
found that the alleged nondisclosure incorporated a claim of deception,
it denied recovery because the nondisclosure was not causally linked to
Schreiber's losses. 53
In conclusion, the Third Circuit stated that although it did not ap-
prove of the alleged self-dealing conduct of the defendants, it was con-
strained by the language in Santa Fe stating that the federal securities
laws were designed to ensure full disclosure, and were not intended to
create a federal remedy for every form of fiduciary misconduct. 54 As a
result, the court determined that Schreiber's only recourse was to file a
state law claim for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract.
55
Generally, section 14(e) contains two distinct prohibitory clauses:
the first proscribes misstatements and omissions of material fact, and the
second prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts. 56 Schrei-
ber's first claim was that the defendants engaged in manipulative acts in
50. Id. The Schreiber court conceded that the language in § 14(e) could be
interpreted to proscribe a broader range of conduct than misrepresentation or
deception. Id. In light of the legislative intent and relevant Supreme Court pre-
cedent, however, the Third Circuit was convinced that deception was a require-
ment of manipulation under § 14(e).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Specifically, the Schreiber court held that
[t]he losses . . . sustained were the result of Burlington's decision to
cancel the December offer, a decision unaffected by Burlington's al-
leged nondisclosure in the January offer. Even if Burlington had made
full disclosure in the January offer, this information would have made
no difference to shareholders like Schreiber, whose injury had already
been caused by the December recission. Lacking a causal link between
the alleged misrepresentation and the injuries, Schreiber's second the-
ory also fails.
Id.
54. Id. at 167.
55. Id. at 167 & n.5. A state law breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty action on behalf of the same class of shareholders represented by Schreiber
in federal court is pending before the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Gilbert
v. El Paso Co., No. 7075 (Del. Ch. filed Jan. 17, 1984).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). For the text of § 14(e), see supra note 6. See
also Note, A Negligence Standard for Material Misstatements and Omissions in Tender
Offers Under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
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violation of the second clause of section 14(e). 5 7 Much controversy has
arisen as to what constitutes a manipulative act within the purview of
section 14(e). 58 Unable to find a definition of manipulation within the
Williams Act or either of the Securities Acts, the Schreiber court, and
other courts, have relied on the definition the Supreme Court has set
forth in interpreting manipulation under rule 10b-5.59 It is suggested
that this reliance is proper in light of the fact that manipulation is a tech-
nical term, and therefore should be consistently defined throughout the
Securities Acts. 60
In defining manipulation under rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court in
Santa Fe found that the term refers "generally to practices, such as wash
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead in-
vestors by artificially affecting market activity."' 6 ' In Ernst & Ernst, an-
other case involving rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court declared that
manipulation "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the mar-
ket price of securities."'6 2 In these two decisions, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court consistently applied a two-part definition of manipula-
tion. This definition requires that first, the defendant engage in conduct
which artificially affects the market price of the stock, and second, the
defendant intend to mislead or deceive investors through this
conduct. 6 3
In comparing this two-part definition to the formulation articulated
in Mobil, it is suggested that the Mobil definition of manipulation fails to
satisfy the Supreme Court's two requirements. In Mobil, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that U.S. Steel's acts were manipulative in violation of section
57. 731 F.2d at 165.
58. There is currently a split of opinion among the circuits as to whether
some form of deception or misrepresentation is a necessary element of manipu-
lation under § 14(e). For a further discussion of this controversy, see supra notes
25-38 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166 (citing Santa Fe; Ernst & Ernst); Ballard
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Mobil, 664 F.2d at
374 (same).
60. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77 (manipulation is a "technical term"). In
Ernst & Ernst, the claim before the Supreme Court was for manipulation under
rule 10b-5, but the Court looked beyond the rule and found that manipulation is
"virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets." 425 U.S. at
199 (emphasis added).
61. 430 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the facts and
reasoning in Santa Fe, see supra note 43.
62. 425 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Ernst & Ernst, see supra note 44.
63. In Schreiber, the district court clearly set forth this two-part definition,
stating that manipulative activity must artificially affect the market price and do so
in a misleading or deceptive manner. 568 F. Supp. at 202. See also Note, Tender Offer
Defensive Tactics and The Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 634 (1983)
(definition of manipulation contains two elements: first an intent to deceive or
mislead; second an artificial affecting of market activity).
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14(e) solely because they artificially affected market activity. 64 This
holding is improper because it focuses exclusively on the artificiality ele-
ment. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit disregarded the second requirement
by expressly finding that manipulation occurred despite the fact that all
conduct affecting the market was fully disclosed, and thus could not
have misled or deceived the investors. 6 5
Because the Mobil court failed to require this second element of de-
ception in its definition of manipulation, it is suggested that the Schreiber
court properly declined to follow that court's reasoning.66 By following
the lead of the Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge and Data Probe instead, the
Third Circuit correctly agreed that the definition of manipulation under
section 14(e) includes an element of deception. 67
Furthermore, in applying the Supreme Court's two-part definition
to the manipulative conduct alleged in Schreiber, it becomes clear that
Burlington's conduct did not constitute manipulation. Schreiber al-
leged that the cancellation of the validly accepted December tender offer
was a manipulative act in violation of section 14(e). 68 Arguably, the
withdrawal of the December tender offer artificially affected El Paso's
stock price, and therefore satisfied the first element of the Supreme
Court's definition. 6 9 In order to satisfy the second element of the
Supreme Court's definition, however, the defendants must have also in-
tended to mislead or deceive the shareholders by cancelling the Decem-
64. 669 F.2d at 375. For a full discussion of the Mobil holding, see supra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 376-77. The Sixth Circuit did concede that nondisclosure is usu-
ally an essential element of manipulation; nonetheless, the Mobil court con-
cluded that there were instances, such as the case before it, where disclosure will
not prevent a finding of manipulation. Id. at 376. The Mobil court's major con-
cern was that Marathon's shareholders had no real choice but to accept U.S.
Steel's offer, even if they were fully informed of the effects of the lock-up op-
tions. Id. at 377. In other words, the concern that prompted the Mobil court to
find manipulation was that the defendants had treated the shareholders unfairly.
That was exactly the problem before the Santa Fe Court, however, where the
minority shareholders claimed that they were treated unfairly because they had
no choice but to sell their stock to the majority. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
Yet the Supreme Court held that unfair treatment alone did not amount to ma-
nipulation under the federal securities laws. Id.
66. 731 F.2d at 166. For further criticism of the Mobil decision see Prentice,
supra note 16, at 353-58; Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation: Tactics and Strategies
After Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J. 975, 991-95 (1982); Note, supra note 29, at 281-82;
Note, Lock- Up Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act, 12 SETON HALL
L. REv. 881, 891-95 (1982).
67. 731 F.2d at 165-66. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's holdings in
Buffalo Forge and Data Probe, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
68. 731 F.2d at 165.
69. The district court conceded that the defendants' conduct with respect
to the tender offer influenced the price of the stock. 568 F. Supp. at 203. After
finding no deception in its analysis of Schreiber's manipulation claim, however,
the Third Circuit did not proceed to analyze whether the defendants' conduct
artificially affected the market price of El Paso's stock. 731 F.2d at 166-67.
19851 297
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ber tender offer. All of the defendants' conduct in the course of
cancelling the December offer was fully disclosed, and therefore was not
misleading or deceiving. 70 As a result, Burlington's alleged misconduct
fails to satisfy the second part of the Supreme Court's definition of ma-
nipulation, and thus the Schreiber court properly dismissed Schreiber's
manipulation claim.
It is further suggested that the Schreiber court properly rejected
Schreiber's manipulation claim in light of the Supreme Court's rationale
in Santa Fe. In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that conduct which
gave rise to a state law claim did not implicate the federal securities laws
if the full disclosure requirements of federal law were satisfied. 7' A
main policy consideration behind this holding was the Supreme Court's
reluctance to federalize areas of traditional state law when the federal
interest in disclosure had been served. 72 This reluctance is equally ap-
plicable in the context of Schreiber's claim for manipulation which es-
sentially constituted a state law claim-breach of contract. 73 As the
Schreiber court noted, the conduct which gave rise to this claim was fully
disclosed to the El Paso shareholders.7 4 As a result of this disclosure,
the Third Circuit properly adhered to the principles set forth in Santa Fe,
and found that the federal securities laws did not provide Schreiber a
remedy, because to do so would federalize an area of traditional state
law.
Schreiber's second claim alleged that defendants violated section
14(e)'s prohibition of misstatements and omissions of material fact 75 by
failing to disclose in the January tender offer the material facts that
(1) El Paso granted golden parachutes to certain members of its board
of directors, and (2) El Paso's management interfered with the Decem-
ber offer and approved the January offer because of self-dealing mo-
tives. 76 Schreiber alleged that this misconduct, which essentially
constituted a breach of the directors' fidiciary duty, injured her to the
extent that she was deprived of the benefits of the December tender
70. 731 F.2d at 166. The Schreiber court specifically found that the defend-
ants disclosed all conduct concerning the withdrawal of the December tender
offer to the shareholders. Id.
71. 430 U.S. at 479-80.
72. Id. For a full discussion of the Santa Fe opinion, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
73. 731 F.2d at 165. Schreiber's manipulation claim alleged that Burling-
ton wrongfully withdrew its December offer after it was fully subscribed by the
El Paso shareholders. Id. This claim could be litigated under traditional state
law contract principles of offer and acceptance. See id. (Schreiber seeks to "con-
vert an arguable breach of contract into a Williams Act violation").
74. Id. at 166. The Schreiber court specifically stated that defendants "dis-
closed to the shareholders and to the general public the acts that allegedly con-
stitute a breach of contract." Id.
75. For a discussion of § 14(e)'s two prohibitory clauses and their applica-
tion, see supraonote 6 and accompanying text.
76. 731 F.2d at 166.
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offer.
7 7
Although the Third Circuit, in analyzing Schreiber's manipulation
claim, recognized that actions under rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) were
analogous, 78 the court failed to consider whether the principles gov-
erning rule 1Ob-5 decisions were applicable in analyzing Schreiber's ma-
terial omission claim. It is suggested that rule lOb-5 case law should
apply because the language prohibiting material omissions and misstate-
ments of fact in rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) is identical. 7 9 Therefore,
Congress arguably intended the two antifraud provisions to be inter-
preted similarly, at least in regard to material omission and misstate-
ment claims.8 0
77. Id.
78. Id. at 167.
79. Rule 10b-5 reads in part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(1) to employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). For
the full text of § 14(e), see supra note 6.
80. Because § 14(e) and rule lOb-5 have similar language and goals, both
courts and commentators alike have held that the two antifraud provisions are
analogous. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.)
("The two provisions are coextensive in their antifraud prohibitions ...
[T]hey are therefore construed in pari materia by courts."), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and. . . § 14(e) are obviously aimed at the same general
evils . . . and should be similarly construed."); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tac-
tics-Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 642
(1982) (no indication in legislative history that the two antifraud provisions
should be interpreted differently). It is arguable, however, that § 14(e) should
have a broader application than rule lob-5 because of the Supreme Court's
mandate in Santa Fe that rule lOb-5 be read in light of § 10(b). See 430 U.S. at
471-74. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate ....
15 U.S.C. § 78j(h) (1982). Because rule l0b-5 is limited by § 10(b), and § 10(b)
only prohibits manipulative and deceptive acts, while § 14(e) prohibits not only
manipulative and deceptive acts, but also fraudulent acts, § 14(e) could be read
to cover more conduct than rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits
of Section 14(e) of The Williams Act, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1171, 1194-95 (1984) (use of
term fraudulent in § 14(e) connotes § 14(e) has broader coverage than rule lOb-
5); Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests
for Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169, 226 (1981) (use of fraudulent acts and
13
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The Third Circuit, instead of adopting this approach, used a trun-
cated analysis, found no causation between the alleged omissions and
Schreiber's injury, and dismissed Schreiber's second claim.8 1 Although
stating that it did not approve of the alleged self-dealing conduct, the
court concluded that the language in Santa Fe required it to find that
Schreiber's claims were not actionable under the securities laws.8 2
Upon a closer reading of the Santa Fe decision and in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,83 it is
suggested that the Third Circuit's reliance on the instructions in Santa Fe
and its analysis of causation were improper.
In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court, in arriving at its conclusion, specifi-
cally relied on the trial court's finding of fact that there was full disclo-
sure to the shareholders of all information concerning the merger.8 4
Based on this finding, the Santa Fe Court held that a "breach of fiduciary
duty, . . . without any deception, misrepresentation or non-disclosure," did not
violate rule lOb-5. 8 5 In contrast to Santa Fe, the claim in Schreiber was
not merely that defendants' breached their fiduciary duty, but also that
they failed to disclose the material facts underlying this breach.8 6
Therefore, it is submitted that the Santa Fe Court's analysis relied on by
the Third Circuit does not control the issue at hand.8 7
practices language in § 14(e) suggests § 14(e) has a broader scope than rule
lOb-5).
Regardless of whether § 10(b)'s limitation on rule lOb-5 results in § 14(e)
having a broader application, it is suggested that material omission and misstate-
ment claims under § 14(e) and rule lOb-5 should be similarly analyzed. The
mandate that rule 10b-5 be read in light of § 10(b) does not affect material omis-
sion or misstatement claims under rule lOb-5 because such claims incorporate
an element of deception, and thus fit within the scope of § 10(b). See Santa Fe,
430 U.S. at 475 n.15 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. 128). Because Congress took
the language proscribing material omissions and misstatements in § 14(e) verba-
tim from rule lOb-5, these claims should be similarly analyzed under either
provision.
81. 731 F.2d at 166. For the Third Circuit's specific holding on the issue of
causation, see supra note 53.
82. Id. at 167. In arriving at this conclusion, the Schreiber court relied on the
language of Santa Fe, stating: "Once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the
fairness of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." Id.
(citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78). It is suggested, however, that the Third
Circuit improperly relied on this language because in Schreiber's second claim,
she was specifically asserting a lack of full disclosure.
83. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
84. 430 U.S. at 474. For a full discussion of the facts of Santa Fe, see supra
note 43.
85. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
86. 731 F.2d at 166. For the specific allegations set forth in Schreiber's
second claim, see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
87. See Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874 (1978) (Santa Fe decision elimi-
nates from rule lOb-5 coverage only a case which includes no allegation of
deception).
14
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In what has been found to be an important footnote,8 8 however, the
Santa Fe opinion did address this issue. Footnote fourteen addressed
the Santa Fe plaintiff's alternative claim that the failure to give advance
notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure in violation of rule
lOb-5. Fairly read, the footnote stated that there was no material omis-
sion because the shareholders did not indicate how they could have ac-
ted to avoid their injuries had the undisclosed facts been disclosed.8 9
Conversely, it seems that if the shareholders had indicated how they
could have prevented their damages by acting differently had they
known the undisclosed facts, the Court would have found a material
omission. 90
88. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. Footnote 14 of the Santa Fe opinion reads as
follows:
In addition to their principal argument that the complaint alleges a
fraud under clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, respondents also argue
that the complaint alleges nondisclosure and misrepresentation in vio-
lation of clause (b) of the Rule. Their major contention in this respect
is that the majority stockholder's failure to give the minority advance
notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure, even though the
Delaware shortform merger statute does not require such notice. But
respondents do not indicate how they might have acted differently had they had
prior notice of the merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion of both
courts below that under Delaware law they could not have enjoined the
merger because an appraisal proceeding is their sole remedy in the Del-
aware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger.
Thus, the failure to give advance notice was not a material nondisclo-
sure within the meaning of the statute or the Rule.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reap-
praisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 264
(1980) (footnote fourteen has become an important caveat to the Santa Fe
holding).
89. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. The shareholders could not indicate how they
might have acted differently had notice been given because they would not have
been able to stop the merger in any event. Under Delaware law, as it was under-
stood at that time, the sole remedy available to dissatisfied minority sharehold-
ers was to petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for an appraisal of the fair
value of their shares. Id. at 465. After Santa Fe was decided, however, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court reevaluated its merger law precedent and adopted a new
approach. See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979);
Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). For a discussion of this change in Delaware law, see
Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 88, at 264, 277-81.
90. It is suggested that this analysis of materiality is consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
In TSC, the Supreme Court held that under § 14(e), a fact is material if "the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder." Id. at 449. The only way a fact could assume actual
significance in an investor's decision, it is submitted, is if the investor could take
some action pursuant to its disclosure.
The TSC definition has subsequently been applied to actions brought under
both rule lOb-5 and § 14(e). See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640
F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule lOb-5), aff'd in part, rev 'din part on other grounds, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(rule lOb-5); Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1985]
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The consequence of deeming the omission material is very signifi-
cant in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute.9 1 In a rule
1Ob-5 decision, the Affiliated Ute Court held that in cases involving non-
disclosure, a showing that the omitted fact was material established the
necessary element of causation in fact. 92
Read together, Santa Fe and Affiliated Ute provide a framework for
analyzing material omission claims under section 14(e), even in cases
such as Schreiber where the omission was of conduct which constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty actionable under state law. The two cases stand
for the proposition that if a plaintiff can show an alternate course of
action that could have been taken to avoid harm had there been full
disclosure, then the nondisclosure is material, and the causation ele-
ment is established. 93 Applying this analysis to the Schreiber case, Schrei-
ber needed to demonstrate that she could have followed an alternate
1979) (§ 14(e)); Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d
1140 (2d Cir. 1979) (§ 14(e)).
91. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
92. Id. at 152-54 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970)). In Mills, the Supreme Court applied the same test under the proxy
rules. 396 U.S. at 385. The Mills holding was later reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in TSC, 426 U.S. at 444 (noting that the definition of materiality now as-
sumes a "heightened significance").
Before the Affiliated Ute decision, reliance was a necessary element of a rule
lOb-5 cause of action. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.)
(reliance required for civil action under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965). This requirement arose because actions under rule 10b-5 were shaped
around the common law action of deceit, in which proof of reliance was neces-
sary to show that the fraudulent conduct caused the alleged injury. See Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584,
586-87 (1975).
In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulties inherent in
showing proof of reliance on a fact that was not disclosed. 406 U.S. at 152-54.
As a result, the Court reasoned that in cases of nondisclosure, "positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material. . . . [The] obligation to disclose and this withholding of a
material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact." Id. (citations
omitted).
93. Underlying this approach is the premise that all information the disclo-
sure of which would allow a shareholder to alter her position in order to avoid
harm is material, i.e., it is that type of information which a reasonable share-
holder would consider in making an investment decision. See supra note 90. A
further premise behind this analysis is that once materiality is shown, causation
is established without the need to show reliance. It is suggested that this prem-
ise is correct because both the letter and spirit of Affiliated Ute show, at least in
cases of nondisclosure, that proof of materiality has been substituted for proof
of reliance as the necessary element to prove causation. See, e.g., Titan Group,
Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1975) (materiality rather than reliance is
the decisive element to show causation in nondisclosure cases); Shapiro v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974) (Affili-
ated Ute eliminates any reliance requirement in nondisclosure cases; only
materiality need be shown); A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE
lOb-5, § 64.02, at 3-326 (1984) (once materiality is shown, causation is estab-
lished as a matter of law). But cf Note, supra note 92 (in nondisclosure cases
16
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course of action aimed at preventing the withdrawal of the December
tender offer had there been full disclosure. For example, she could have
argued that had there been full disclosure in connection with the Janu-
ary tender offer, she could have sought to enjoin El Paso's management
from wrongfully interfering with the fully subscribed December tender
offer. 94 Alternatively, she could have asserted that had there been full
disclosure, she could have attempted to rally the other shareholders to
reject the less lucrative January tender offer, which would most likely
have led to Burlington's reinstatement of the December tender offer.
9 5
In this manner, Schreiber would have provided the court a basis upon
which to find that the omissions were material and caused her injury.
Admittedly, Schreiber's material omission claim, like her claim that
the substitution of the January tender offer for the December tender of-
fer constituted a manipulative act, incorporates an element of state
law-breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. It is suggested, however,
that unlike Schreiber's manipulation claim, the policy concerns underly-
ing the Santa Fe decision do not justify a refusal to resolve Schreiber's
after Affiliated Ute, a showing of materiality leads only to a rebuttable presump-
tion of reliance).
94. A similar line of argument has been accepted by the circuit courts in
deciding claims for failure to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty under rule lOb-
5. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). Ala-
bama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v.
Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). But see Beisenbach v.
Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978). In this line of cases, the courts have
looked solely to the issue of whether the shareholder could have brought a state
court action to enjoin the transactions if the undisclosed facts were disclosed; if
the plaintiff could have brought such an action, then the omission was material
.and the plaintiff could recover.
Much controversy has arisen, however, as to whether a plaintiff need actu-
ally prove that the state court action would have been successful. The circuit
courts have taken a variety of positions on this key issue. See, e.g., Healey, 616
F.2d 641 (test is whether there would have been a reasonable probability of ulti-
mate success in the state court action); Alabama Farm Bureau, 606 F.2d 602 (plain-
tiff need only show a prima facie case for relief under state law). For an in depth
discussion of this line of cases, see Note, supra note 88.
95. As this proposed allegation suggests, it is submitted that these cases
need not be limited to the narrow issue of whether there was a state law claim
which could have been brought if there had been full disclosure. See supra note
94. If a plaintiff can show that there was some preventative action that could
have been taken to avoid harm had there been distlosure, including a state law
suit, then it is submitted that the omitted facts were material, causation is estab-
lished, and the plaintiff should recover. The degree to which a plaintiff must
prove that the alternate course of action would have been successful would still
need to be settled. It is suggested, however, that requiring too great a burden of
proof would undermine the policy behind Affiliated Ute, because it would effec-
tively reinstate the need for the plaintiff to show reliance on the undisclosed
facts.
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material omission claim under the federal securities laws.9 6 The princi-
pal claim in Santa Fe was found to be completely a state law issue be-
cause there was no assertion of nondisclosure. 97 As a result, the
Supreme Court refused to find a cause of action under the federal secur-
ities laws for fear of federalizing state corporate law. 98 Unlike the Santa
Fe plaintiff, however, Schreiber also asserted that the defendants' non-
disclosure of the existence of the golden parachutes and their impact on
the El Paso directors constituted a material omission in violation of sec-
tion 14(e). 9 9 Because the main goal of section 14(e) and the federal
securities laws in general is full disclosure,' 0 0 a federal remedy should
be allowed where frustration of that goal causes injury to the investor-
the person for whose protection the disclosure requirements were en-
acted.' 0 ' This federal cause of action should be available in cases of
nondisclosure, regardless of whether state law is also implicated.
In conclusion, it is suggested that courts should not expand the def-
inition of manipulation under section 14(e) to encompass more activity
than that which falls within the Supreme Court's two-part definition. As
a result, manipulative acts should only include conduct that artificially
affects the stock market price and is intended to mislead or deceive in-
vestors. In light of this definition, the Third Circuit's requirement of an
element of deception as an essential ingredient of manipulation under
section 14(e) was proper.
In addition, as the Third Circuit's resolution of Schreiber's second
claim indicates, there is much uncertainty as to what constitutes a mate-
rial omission actionable under section 14(e). Furthermore, it is unclear
how federal courts should analyze nondisclosures of conduct which con-
stitutes a breach of a director's fiduciary duty under state law. It is sug-
gested that the analysis derived from Santa Fe and Affiliated Ute provides a
good basis upon which to resolve section 14(e) material omission claims,
regardless of whether the claim is also actionable at state law. It is
strongly urged, however, that the Supreme Court address the unan-
swered issues raised in Schreiber by setting forth the appropriate defini-
96. For a further discussion of the policy concerns underlying Santa Fe and
their effect on Schreiber's manipulation claim, see supra note 72-74 and accom-
panying text.
97. 430 U.S. at 474-79. The Supreme Court specifically found that this
"case comes to us on the premise that the complaint failed to allege a material
misrepresentation or material failure to disclose." Id.
98. Id. at 478.
99. 731 F.2d at 166.
100. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78 (the fundamental purpose of the Se-
curities Exchange Act is to assure full and fair disclosure).
101. The Williams Act was specifically designed to protect investors. See
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (the sole purpose of the Williams
Act is the protection of investors). For a further discussion of the purpose of the
Williams Act and, specifically, § 14(e), see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 30: p. 287304
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/7
1985] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 305
tion of manipulation under section 14(e), and by defining the proper
scope of section 14(e)'s prohibition of material omissions, particularly
where the omissions also give rise to state law claims. Such guidelines
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